

# ID-based Cryptography and Smart-Cards

*Survol des techniques cryptographiques basées sur  
l'identité et implémentation sur carte à puce*

## The Need for Cryptography

- Encryption
  - Transform a message so that only the intended recipient can read it
  - Privacy concerns
- Digital signature
  - Relate a message to an individual
  - Publicly verifiable and (computationally) impossible to forge
    - Non-repudiation

# Secret-Key Cryptography

- Cytale, Caesar, Vernam, DES, ...
  - Symmetric encryption



# Symmetric Encryption



Alice



Bob



Alice and Bob share the **same** key: 

# Secret-Key Cryptography

- Cytale, Caesar, Vernam, DES, ...
  - Symmetric encryption



- Limitations
  - Number of keys:  $n(n-1)/2 \approx n^2$
  - Key distribution

# Public-Key Cryptography


- Inventors
  - Whitfield Diffie
  - Martin Hellman
  - Ralph Merkle




- Publications
  - W. Diffie & M. Hellman, New directions in cryptography, IEEE TIT, 22 : 644-654, 1976
  - R. Merkle, Secure communications over insecure channels, CACM, 21: 294-299, 1978

# Analogy


- Privacy
  - Exchange of encrypted mail



- Analogy to padlocked boxes



# Padlocked Boxes



# Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange



**Alice**

?  $x_A$

$$K_A = g^{x_A} \bmod p \longrightarrow$$

$$\longleftarrow K_B = g^{x_B} \bmod p$$

$$K_{AB} = (K_B)^{x_A} \bmod p$$

$$K_{BA} = (K_A)^{x_B} \bmod p$$

$$K_{AB} = K_{BA}$$



**Bob**

?  $x_B$

# Cryptographic Assumptions

- CDH problem
  - Given  $(g^x \bmod p, g^y \bmod p, g, p)$ , compute  $g^{xy} \bmod p$
- DL problem
  - Given  $(g^x \bmod p, g, p)$ , compute  $x$

# Public-Key Cryptosystems

- Diffie-Hellman allows to exchange a secret over an insecure channel
- Limitations
  - Delays
  - "Man-in-the-middle" attack
- Public-key cryptography
  - Asymmetric encryption
  - Exchange of encrypted mails (2)



# Rivest-Shamir-Adleman

- 3 M.I.T. researchers
  - Leonard Adleman
  - Ronald Rivest
  - Adi Shamir
- Publication
  - R. Rivest, A. Shamir & L. Adleman, A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems, CACM, 21 : 120-126, 1978



## RSA Cryptosystem (1/3)

- $\text{Dec}_{\text{SK}_B}(\text{Enc}_{\text{PK}_B}(m)) = m$
- Group  $(\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z})^*$ 
  - Modular exponentiation in  $(\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z})^*$ 
    - Permutation iff  $\gcd(e, \phi(N)) = 1$
  - Euler theorem
- Security based on factoring  $N$

## RSA Cryptosystem (2/3)

- Key generation (Bob)
  - $p_B$  et  $q_B$ ,  $N_B = p_B q_B$ ,  $e_B$  s.t.  $\gcd(e_B, \phi(N_B)) = 1$
  - $\text{PK} = \{e_B, N_B\}$
  - $\text{SK} = \{p_B, q_B, d_B\}$  with  $d_B = e_B^{-1} \bmod \phi(N_B)$
- Encryption (Alice)
  - $C = m^{e_B} \bmod N_B$
- Decryption (Bob)
  - $C^{d_B} \bmod N_B$
- (Paddings)

## RSA Cryptosystem (3/3)



**Alice**

$e_B, N_B$

$$C = m^{e_B} \bmod N_B \longrightarrow$$



**Bob**

$$m = C^{d_B} \bmod N_B$$

Bob's certificate needs to be verified

## Other Applications

- RSA signature (1978)
  - Based on factoring
  - Dual function of RSA encryption
- ElGamal encryption/signature (1985)
  - Based on DL
  - Other groups (e.g., elliptic curves)



# Identity-Based Cryptography

- Inventor
  - Adi Shamir, 1984
- Key idea
  - Identity serves as public-key
  - Certificates become **implicit** (inside a domain)
- No known solution for encryption



# Identity-Based Encryption (1/2)



- Y. Desmedt and J.-J. Quisquater, 1986




- Security assumptions
  - $\text{Enc}(\text{Dec}(m)) = m$
  - $\text{Enc} \neq \text{Dec}$
  - **Tamper resistance**

## Identity-Based Encryption (2/2)

  
**Alice**

 = master key  
 = Bob's secret key

  
**Bob**





## Boneh-Franklin

- Stanford/UC Davis researchers

- Dan Boneh
- Matt Franklin



- Publication

- D. Boneh & M. Franklin, Identity based encryption from the Weil pairing, SIAM J. on Computing 32:586-615, 2003



## Boneh-Franklin IBE (1/3)

- $\text{Dec}_{\text{SK}_B}(\text{Enc}_{\text{ID}_B}(m)) = m$
- Admissible bilinear map  $e: \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$ , i.e.,
  - [bilinear]  $e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)^{ab}$
  - [non-degenerate]  $e(P, P) \neq 1$
  - [computable] efficient algorithm for  $e$
- Security based on BDH problem
  - Given  $(P, aP, bP, cP)$ , compute  $e(P, P)^{abc}$

## Boneh-Franklin IBE (2/3)

- Set-up (TTP)
  - $e: \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$ ,  $h: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$ ,  $H: \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{m/}$
  - master SK:  $s$
  - $\text{PK} = \{P_{\text{pub}} = sP, P, e, h, H\}$
- Extract (TTP) — e.g., for Bob
  - $d_{\text{ID}_B} = s Q_{\text{ID}_B}$  where  $Q_{\text{ID}_B} = h(\text{ID}_B)$
- Encryption (Alice)
  - $Q_{\text{ID}_B} = h(\text{ID}_B)$  and  $g_{\text{ID}_B} = e(Q_{\text{ID}_B}, P_{\text{pub}})$
  - $(C_1, C_2) = (rP, m \oplus H(g_{\text{ID}_B}))$
- Decryption (Bob)
  - $m = C_2 \oplus H(e(d_{\text{ID}_B}, C_1))$

## Boneh-Franklin IBE (3/3)



**Alice**



**Bob**

System parameters

$$Q_{ID_B} = h(ID_B)$$

$$g_{ID_B} = e(Q_{ID_B}, P_{pub})$$

$$(C_1, C_2) = (rP, m \oplus H(g_{ID_B}^r)) \longrightarrow$$

$$m = C_2 \oplus H(e(d_{ID_B}, C_1))$$

Verification of certificates is *implicit* (inside the domain)

## Smart IBE




- Boneh-Franklin protocol on smart cards
- Prototype library
  - allowing to perform encryption/decryption
- First solution with the entire pairing computation performed on the smart card

## Summary & Perspectives

- State of the art
  - Symmetric encryption (3DES, AES)
  - Asymmetric encryption (RSA, ECC)
  - ID-based encryption (Boneh-Franklin IBE)
- Smart card solutions for ID-based encryption
  - Desmedt-Quisquater IBE
  - Boneh-Franklin IBE (**Smart IBE**)
- Future research
  - More efficient implementations of pairings on **constrained** devices
  - Share the master key *s* amongst **several** TTPs
  - Design an IBE based on "**standard**" assumptions

## Comments/Questions?



More info:

<http://www.geocities.com/MarcJoye/>